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implementation has potential pitfalls. We argue that the best mechanism for implementing 
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1. Introduction 
Price ceilings are a widely recognised option to limit the risk that carbon prices exceed 
acceptable levels if constraining emissions turns out to be more expensive than expected, 
and so provide greater certainty to emitters. The mirror instrument is a price floor, which 
would ensure a minimum price on carbon, thereby providing more certainty for investors 
in low emissions technologies. It would also allow emissions to go lower than a target set 
by the administrator, thus providing more abatement if costs are lower than expected. Both 
price ceilings and price floors can reduce risk and price volatility in carbon markets, which 
has been of concern in the EU ETS (Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006).  
However, such ‘hybrid’ instruments also present specific challenges for scheme design 
and for trading of permits between countries, and in terms of their budgetary impacts.  
There has been considerable discussion of approaches that include a price ceiling, also 
known as a ‘safety valve’ (Aldy et al., 2001; Jacoby and Ellerman, 2004; Pizer, 2002; 
McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2002; McKibbin et. al., 2009). Price ceilings have been 
proposed for various carbon trading schemes, for example in Australia (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2008), and in less direct ways for the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI, 2008) and the Waxman-Markey Bill as passed by the United States House of 
Representatives in June 2009 (H.R. 2454, 2009).  
The academic and policy debate on price floors is much less developed. One of the novel 
aspects of the Waxman-Markey Bill is that it stipulates a reserve price (of US$10/tCO2-e) 
when permits are auctioned, which will increase by 5% above the consumer price index 
each year. This reserve price could function as a price floor.  
Calls in early 2009 for a price floor to be introduced to the EU emissions trading scheme, 
via an auction reserve price, were rejected by the European Commission. The European 
Commission claimed that “a floor price may unduly interfere with the market” (Gardner, 
2009). However, this argument holds little water as permit markets are entirely the product 
of government regulation in the first place. It also runs counter to stated EU interests to 
achieve ambitious climate mitigation outcomes. The proposed Australian ETS also does 
not include price floor provisions.  
In this paper we examine the rationale for incorporating a floor price in emissions trading 
schemes and propose that the best way to implement them is to have firms paying a tax or 
extra fee as well as buying permits. Compared to the alternatives, it has budgetary 
advantages, and in contrast to the alternatives, it is compatible with international trading of 
permits. It can also be used to implement more general hybrid approaches to putting a 
price on emissions.  
2. A rationale for price floors 
A range of arguments can be made in favour of price floors, relating to price volatility, 
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Price floors (and ceilings) truncate the possible range of permit prices in the market and 
hence can reduce price volatility. Price volatility can also be reduced by banking and 
borrowing of permits, with short term market fluctuations tempered through longer term 
price expectations. But recent experience with the EU ETS suggests that volatility still 
remains. Between July 2008 and February 2009, when banking and borrowing were 
available, the EU permit price declined from around €30 to less than €9.  
Investments such as power plants, buildings, and infrastructure involve long term time 
horizons. A price floor gives investors in low-emissions assets greater certainty about the 
minimum return to their investments – it effectively provides insurance against low carbon 
prices, analogous to the insurance function of a price ceiling against cost blow-outs to 
owners of existing high-emissions assets.  
Successful technological innovations lower the carbon price for a particular emissions 
target, or increase the amount of emissions reductions achievable at a particular carbon 
price. The economically efficient response is to increase the amount of abatement, to keep 
the abatement cost in line with the social cost of emissions. Under a pure cap-and-trade 
approach, innovation will only increase abatement if the regulator adjusts emissions 
targets in response to the lower, or lower than expected, carbon price. A price floor by 
contrast provides a mechanism for additional emissions reductions to be achieved 
automatically. 
Uncertainty about abatement costs affects the relative performance of abatement 
mechanisms in terms of their expected welfare impacts, as shown by Weitzman (1974) for 
the comparison between price and quantity instruments. Hybrid approaches under 
uncertainty were studied by Roberts and Spence (1976), who examined pollution 
reduction when the costs of pollution reduction are uncertain, but the benefits are known. 
It was found that the expected net benefits of using a hybrid approach with both a price 
floor and a price ceiling are significantly higher than for a purely price or quantity based 
approach. Quantitative modelling for climate change mitigation (Burtraw et. al., 2009; 
Philibert, 2008) is consistent with this conclusion. 
 
3. Mechanisms for a price floor 
Two main mechanisms have been proposed for a price floor in an emissions trading 
scheme: 
1.  The administrator commits to buy back licenses at the floor price, thereby reducing 
the amount of permits in the market (Hepburn, 2006). A similar approach is for the 
administrator to commit to pay a subsidy to firms that possess more permits than 
required to cover their emissions, the subsidy being proportional to the number of 
excess permits (Roberts and Spence, 1976). 
2.  A reserve price applies when permits are auctioned, again limiting the amount of 
permits available to emitters (Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006). 
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3.  Emitters have to pay an extra fee (or tax) for each ton of carbon emitted, in 
addition to having to surrender a permit. The effective carbon price then becomes 
equal to the sum of the permit price and the extra fee. 
 
3.1. A commitment to buy back permits 
A commitment to buy back permits may be theoretically the ‘neatest’ way to implement a 
price floor, because it allows for the price floor to be implemented exactly with just one 
instrument. The market price will never go below the threshold price, and the 
administration of the floor price remains within the cap-and-trade scheme. However, the 
option would likely be unworkable in practice because of budgetary aspects and because it 
would stand in the way of international permit trading. 
A buy-back commitment would create potentially large contingent liabilities to 
governments, through budgetary costs of buying back permits in the market. This would 
be especially problematic where large shares of the total permits available are given out 
freely to start with, or where revenue from the initial sale of permits is earmarked for other 
purposes – one or both being the case for most existing and proposed emissions trading 
schemes.  
International trading in permits would exacerbate the budgetary problems faced by any 
one country, as it would potentially create an unlimited liability for the administrator 
(Garnaut, 2008, p. 310). Even if the buy-back commitment is limited to domestic permits, 
international permits could be used by domestic emitters to substitute for domestic permits, 
effectively extending any one government’s liability overseas. For a commitment to buy 
back permits to be compatible with international trading, it would be required that all of 
the schemes involved have the same price floor (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009). These 
are serious obstacles, akin to those inherent in linking emissions trading schemes with 
price ceilings (Jotzo and Betz, 2009). One way to address these issues is to not have 
international permit trading (McKibbin et. al., 2009), but this would fly in the face of a 
general trend and widespread desire by policymakers to link schemes internationally 
(Tuerk et. al., 2009). 
 
3.2. A reserve price at auction  
The reserve price approach is the one proposed for the United States under Waxman-
Markey, and the one considered but rejected by the European Union. It would imply that 
there is no strict price floor, because although there would be a minimum price that firms 
would pay at auctions, the market price subsequent to auction could fall below the reserve 
price. 
To what extent a reserve price translates into a floor price in part depends on the share of 
permits auctioned. If a large proportion of permits is given out freely, then a situation 
could occur where few or no permits are in fact auctioned, given the reserve price. In this Price Floors for Emissions Trading  5
case, the market price would be above what it would be in a ‘pure’ cap-and-trade scheme 
with the full amount of permits available to emitters, but below the reserve price.  
International trade of permits could also result in the reserve auction price no longer being 
a floor price. If permits from another country’s scheme, or offset credits such as from the 
Clean Development Mechanism, can be imported at a price lower than the reserve price, 
then this will become the source of purchased permits in the domestic scheme rather than 
permits bought at auction from the government. In turn, there is a negative budgetary 
impact for the country attempting (but failing) to uphold a price floor, by way of lacking 
auction revenue. 
 
3.3. An extra fee or tax 
Under this option, emitters have to pay an extra fee (or tax) for each unit of emissions, 
independently of or in addition to their permit obligations, we can write this as 
MC = p + t  
where MC is the marginal cost of abatement (the effective carbon price), p is the permit 
price, and t is the extra fee or tax. 
There are fundamentally two ways that the price of the extra fee could be set: 
a)  A fixed fee on emissions. The fixed fee is equal to the floor price:  
tfix = pmin. 
b)  A variable fee on emissions. When the permit price in the market is less than the 
price floor, the extra fee is equal to the difference of the permit price and the floor 
price; when the permit price is above the floor, the fee is zero.  We can write this 
as 
pmin – p if  p < pmin,
tvariable ={ 
0 otherwise; 
where tvariable is the extra fee, pmin is the floor price, and p is the permit price. 
Under the fixed fee approach, the effective carbon price is prevented from falling below 
the level of the fee, but it is always higher than it would be if there was only the permit 
trading scheme. The approach is similar to what transpires when both a carbon tax and an 
emissions trading scheme are in place simultaneously. Permit trading in any case already 
interacts with various taxes and subsidies that discourage or encourage activities that incur 
carbon emissions – in that sense, the effective carbon price, relative to a hypothetical 
situation of no taxes and subsidies, differs from the permit trading price in any case 
(Babiker et. al., 2004). 
Several countries that take part in EU emission trading scheme also have a carbon tax, 
including Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands (Stavins, 2003). In September 2009, 
France announced that it would introduce a carbon tax in 2010 (Portail du Gouvernment, Price Floors for Emissions Trading  6
2009). The fixed fee approach is similar to ‘emission permit rental charge’ proposed by 
Grafton and Devlin (1996). 
The variable fee approach by contrast more closely achieves the effects of a ‘classic’ price 
floor, as it would be in operation only if and to the extent that the market price falls below 
the threshold level. A complicating factor is that permit prices fluctuate. There are several 
options for deciding what permit price is used when determining the extra fee. One option 
would be to use the permit price on the permit surrender date. Another option would be to 
use the permit price that was paid by the firm. Yet another option would be to use the 
average permit price over the time period in which emissions are being accounted for 
(usually a year). 
It is important to note that an additional fee/tax implemented in a purely domestic scheme 
(and without banking or borrowing) would leave the effective domestic carbon price 
unaffected, as it would reduce the domestic permit price (Figure 1). By contrast, with 
unrestricted international permit trading, the fee gets added to the international permit 
price, and thereby directly affects the effective domestic carbon price.  
It could be argued that combining fees/taxes with permit trading would unnecessarily 
increase transaction costs. However, given that general taxation systems for emitters 
already exist, and that permit trading systems are (about to be) in existence also, the extra 
cost impost is likely to be small. The main transaction costs are associated with 
measurement, reporting and verification, which are incurred only once for both aspects of 
carbon pricing.  
Importantly, the budgetary impacts of the fee models are positive or neutral, and there are 
no risks of budgetary outlays. A fixed fee (or tax) will yield a highly predictable revenue 
stream; a variable fee will yield revenue in the event of low permit prices. In the aftermath 
of large fiscal stimulus spending in all countries that have or are considering emissions 
trading schemes, implementing an emissions tax in addition to permit trading may well 
become an attractive option to help replenish public finances. Additional carbon taxes 
might prove a politically easier route to raise revenue than to reduce the share of permits 
given away freely, which are arrangements arising from hard political bargaining by 
concentrated lobby groups, as Australia’s recent experience has shown (Pezzey et. al., 
2009).   
Perhaps the greatest advantage of the fee/tax approach is that it can be fully compatible 
with international trading of permits. A domestic fee or tax on domestic emissions can be 
implemented in any one country without affecting the international tradability of permits, 
and affects the price of permits in the international market only indirectly. What the fee 
will do is to lower emissions independently of the trading scheme, and so reduce the 
demand for permits relative to the situation without a fee or tax. In the case of a country 
that imports permits from overseas, imposing an emissions fee will result in lower 
emissions and therefore fewer permit imports (Figure 1). This will tend to lower the 
(international) permit price, but only to the extent of that country’s share in international 
permit markets. An extra fee or tax also does not affect arrangements for banking and 
borrowing of permits.  Price Floors for Emissions Trading  7
   
Figure 1. We compare a purely domestic permit market with a large scale international permit market. 
The curved dashed line denotes the marginal cost of abatement. With a purely domestic permit market 
(a), the government sets a quantity of emissions eD, and an extra fee (tax) t. These quantities determine 
the carbon price, MC, and the permit price is given by pD = MC – t. Thus, the effective domestic carbon 
price is unaffected. By contrast, with unrestricted international trading of permits (b), the international 
permit price pI is determined in international markets. The domestic carbon price is given by MC = pI + 
t. Hence, the tax/fee directly influences the effective domestic carbon price.  
 
The situation regarding international tradability would be different if the requirement to 
pay a fee were made an integral feature of the emissions permits issued by any one 
country. If different countries attach different fee conditions to their permits, then 
emissions permits from different countries are no longer the same commodity. 
International trading could still occur, either with different prices for permits from 
different countries, or with equal prices achieved through cross-border arrangements 
between countries on the charging, exempting and remitting of fees. Insofar as economic 
distortions are sizeable or administrative arrangements too complex, it may be preferable 
to separate fees or taxes from permits.  
 
4. Price floors and ceilings  
Some proposals for putting a price on emissions combine both a price floor and a price 
ceiling, in what has been termed a ‘price collar’ (McKibbin et. al., 2009). Roberts and 
Spence (1976) showed that an approach with (possibly multiple) price floors and price 
ceilings would be effective for minimising expected costs under uncertainty. We now look 
at how such schemes could be implemented, using approaches for price floors discussed 
above.  
A fixed price ceiling is beset by similar problems of tradability and government liabilities 
as price floors implemented through buy-back provisions, as discussed above. One way to 
address these issues is to modify the price collar by limiting the amount of extra permits. 
Under this approach, the ceiling is no longer strict; if all of the extra permits are used, the 
carbon price could exceed the ‘ceiling price’. The mechanisms described for implementing 
a price floor can also be used for implementing a modified price collar. The extra permits 
could be auctioned with a reserve price that is higher than the price floor; alternatively, 
firms could be required to pay a higher ‘extra fee’ if they use the extra permits to account Price Floors for Emissions Trading  8
for their emissions. Under the latter approach, the requirement to pay a fee would be an 
integral feature of the permit issued. 
In an approach along these lines, the Waxman-Markey Bill includes an approach that is 
similar to a modified price collar, known as the strategic reserve. Each year a small 
amount (1-3%) of permits are added to the ‘Strategic Reserve Fund’
11. Each quarter, there 
is a strategic reserve auction, which auctions these permits at a higher reserve price than 
the reserve price of the rest of the permits. 
In their appendix, Roberts and Spence (1976) show that by issuing an arbitrary number of 
different kinds of permit, it is possible to approximate any convex damage function 
arbitrarily closely. This could further reduce expected costs. This approach can be 
implemented by auctioning different types of permit at different reserve prices, or having 
firms pay different fees when they surrender different types of permit (Figure 2).  Under 
the second approach, extra administrative arrangements would be required for 
international permit trading, similar to those mentioned above.  
A modified price collar could facilitate international cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. International environmental agreements on issues such as acid rain and 
pollution of the North Sea have had weak binding commitments, but also have had 
ministerial level non-binding commitments that are significantly stronger (Victor, 2007). 
A modified price collar could have the total number of permits based on a binding 
commitment, and the number of extra permits based on the difference between the binding 
and the non-binding commitment. 
                                                 
1 We are referring here to the version of the Bill that was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on 
June 26, 2009 (H.R. 2454, 2009). The Strategic Reserve can also be replenished with unsold permits from 
auctions, and proceeds from Strategic Reserve auctions can be used to purchase offsets in order to replenish 




   
 
 
Figure 2. The curved dashed lines represent alternative marginal abatement cost functions. The solid 
line illustrates the carbon price for some of the policy options described here. The carbon price and 
emissions level are determined by the point where the curves intersect. The marginal abatement cost 
schedules will be unknown in advance, so two possible curves are shown. The lower curve corresponds 
to abatement being cheaper. We illustrate a carbon tax in (a), the carbon price does not change for 
different marginal benefit curves but the amount of emissions can change significantly; for cap-and-
trade (b), the carbon price can vary but the amount of emissions does not change; for cap-and-trade 
with a price floor (c), if the cost of abatement is sufficiently low, the amount of emissions will decrease; 
for a price ceiling (d), because there is less upside risk of the carbon price being too high, the 
administrator may further reduce the amount of emissions; a price collar (e) combines a price ceiling 
with a price floor; the price collar can be modified (f) so that there is still a strict limit on emissions, 
and no longer a strict limit on the carbon price; more general price curves (g), as described in the 
appendix to Roberts and Spence (1976), could also be implemented. 
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5. Conclusions 
There are sound arguments for including price floors in emissions trading. Advantages 
include less price volatility, automatic climate benefits from innovation, and better 
management of cost uncertainty. 
Price floors need to be carefully designed to avoid budgetary liabilities, and to avoid 
barriers to international trade in permits. The most direct approach of a government 
commitment to buy back permits at a threshold price is unlikely to be viable, especially in 
the context of international permit trading. An alternative approach of a minimum reserve 
price for auctioned permits, as pursued in the Waxman-Markey Bill and earlier considered 
by the European Union, could yield the desired effect, but could be ineffective if the share 
of auctioning is small.  
We propose that a superior option is to require the separate payment of a fee or tax on 
domestic emissions, in addition to cap-and-trade. This approach carries desirable 
budgetary implications for national governments, and is fully compatible with 
international permit trading. In fact, this is precisely what governments do where they 
have levy a carbon tax in addition to emissions trading. The fee or tax could be fixed or 
variable, and its impact on the effective domestic carbon price depends on whether permits 
are traded internationally or not. 
The mechanisms proposed for a price floor can also be used to implement a modified 
‘price collar’, as well as more complex hybrid approaches. The addition of a price ceiling, 
with unlimited permits sold at the ceiling price, eliminates the upside price risk from an 
emissions trading scheme. The manifold problems in implementing this approach can be 
addressed by limiting the amount of extra permits available to be issued. The extra permits 
can be auctioned at a reserve price that is higher than the price floor, or can be associated 
with an extra fee that is higher than that for a price floor. 
In summary, price floors are likely to fulfil an important supporting role in ensuring 
effective and efficient climate change mitigation, they can be implemented without 
compromising vital aspects of emissions trading, and their budgetary properties may turn 
out to be highly attractive to governments cash-strapped in the aftermath of fiscal stimulus 
spending. The Waxman-Markey Bill has important design innovations that could support 
minimum carbon prices, but alternative approaches could perform even better. The reform 
of the EU ETS for the post-2012 period offers an opportunity to do better, as does the 
ongoing process of designing emissions trading schemes in Japan, Australia, and other 
countries. As emissions trading schemes are refined and reviewed, price floors may prove 
to be an attractive option for governments. 
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